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ABSTRACT 
The S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e  (SDI) h a s  prompted one o f  t h e  most h e a t e d  
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  d e b a t e s  i n  r e c e n t  t imes .  The c u r r e n t  d e b a t e ,  w i t h i n  t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  and t e c h n i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  d e f e n s e  communities,  h a s  a l r e a d y  and 
w i l l  l i k e l y  c o n t i n u e  t o  c a u s e  e v o l u t i o n  i n  b o t h  program o b j e c t i v e s  and 
s u b s t a n c e .  This  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  e v o l u t i o n ,  compos i t ion ,  and major  i s s u e s  
o f  t h e  SDI. Among t h e  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  a r e  t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  t h e  r a t e  and 
l e v e l  o f  fund ing ,  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  and m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y ,  arms c o n t r o l ,  NATO 
A l l i a n c e  r e a c t i o n s  and involvement ,  t echno logy  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  Union, 
and t h e  m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f  s p a c e .  
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INTRODUCTION 
I n  a  na t ionwide  a d d r e s s  on March 23, 1983,  p r e s i d e n t  Reagan d e s c r i b e d  h i s  
v i s i o n  o f  a  world no l o n g e r  dependent upon t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  d e t e r r e n c e  based 
upon t h e  t h r e a t  o f  n u c l e a r  r e t a l i a t i o n .  H e  c a l l e d  f o r  a  "comprehensive and 
i n t e n s i v e  e f f o r t  t o  d e f i n e  a long-term r e s e a r c h  and development program" t o  
p r o v i d e  f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s  w i t h  new d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and s t r a t e g i c  
o p t i o n s  " t o  ach ieve  our u l t i m a t e  goa l  of  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  t h r e a t  posed by  
s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  m i s s i l e s  ." 
Following t h e  s p e e c h ,  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan commissioned two s t u d i e s  ( t h e  so-  
c a l l e d  F l e t c h e r  and Hoffman s t u d i e s )  t o  examine t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  t h a t  g o a l  
and t o  make recommendations on how t o  p roceed .  11 Among t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  t h e  - 
s t u d i e s  found t h a t  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  becoming a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  might  p r o v i d e  
o p t i o n s  t o  defend a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s ,  and t h a t  p u r s u i t  o f  t h o s e  t e c h n o l -  
o g i e s  cou ld  enhance d e t e r r e n c e  and i n c r e a s e  s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y .  2/ - 
These r e p o r t s  l e d  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  i n  J a n u a r y  1984, t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  r e -  
s e a r c h  program known a s  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e  (SDI).  I t s  purpose ,  ac- 
c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  i s  t o  f i n d  ways t o  p r o v i d e  a  b e t t e r  b a s i s  f o r  d e t e r r i n g  
a g r e s s i o n ,  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  s t a b i l i t y ,  and i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  and i t s  a l l i e s .  According t o  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  SDI i s  des igned  
1 /  U.S. Dept . o f  Defense .  The S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e :  Defens ive  
~ e c h n o l o g i e s  Study.  Apr. 1984. Washington, U.  S. Govt . P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1984.  
27 p .  and U.S. Dept. o f  Defense .  Defense Agains t  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e s :  An 
Assessment of  Techno log ies  and P o l i c y  I m p l i c a t i o n s .  Apr. 1984. Washington,  
U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1984. 22 p .  
2/ The f u l l  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  F l e t c h e r  amd Hoffman s t u d i e s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  
appenTix A .  
t o  e x p l o r e ,  i n  a  manner c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a l l  U .  S. t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  t h e  t e c h -  
n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  a  number o f  d e f e n s i v e  c o n c e p t s  and t e c h n o l o g i e s .  3/ The - 
t e c h n i c a l  knowledge ga ined  through t h e  SDI w i l l  b e  used i n  f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n s  by 
U.S. pol icymakers  on whether t o  develop and d e p l o y  advanced d e f e n s e s .  
S ince  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  i n i t i a l  speech on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  t h e r e  h a s  been much 
c o n f u s i o n  and disagreement  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l  o f  t h e  SDI and t h e  means 
f o r  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  ach ieve  i t .  A p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  o f  c o n t e n t i o n  concerns  t h e  
meaning of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  c a l l  upon t h e  n a t i o n ' s  s c i e n t i f i c  community " t o  g i v e  
us  t h e  means o f  r e n d e r i n g  n u c l e a r  weapons impotent  and o b s o l e t e . "  Some i n f e r  
from t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t o  be  s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h e  SDI must d e t e n n i n e  t h a t  a  100 
p e r c e n t  e f f e c t i v e  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  i s  p o s s i b l e .  The f e a s -  
i b i l i t y  o f  a t t a i n i n g  such a  g o a l  i s  argued on bo th  s i d e s .  However, t h e r e  a r e  
t h o s e  who contend t h a t  a  p e r f e c t  d e f e n s e  i s  not  a  necessa ry  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  
s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  SDI. A/ They a rgue  t h a t  n u c l e a r  weapons c a n  be  rendered  "impotent  
and o b s o l e t e "  by d e f e n s e s  t h a t  s e v e r e l y  reduce  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  ( i . e . ,  a  r a t i o n a l  
a d v e r s a r y  would not adhere  t o  a  n u c l e a r  s t r a t e g y  when o n l y  a  smal l  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
i t s  f o r c e s  would be a b l e  t o  p e n e t r a t e  a  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  them, e s p e c i a l l y  s i n c e  
it would b e  imposs ib le  t o  know ahead o f  t ime  which n u c l e a r  weapons would a c t u a l l y  
r each  t h e i r  t a r g e t s ) .  A r e l a t e d  i s s u e ,  h e r e ,  i s  how t h a t  p o s i t i o n  d i f f e r s  from a  
s i m i l a r  one h e l d  d u r i n g  t h e  A n t i b a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  (ABM) d e b a t e  of  t h e  l a t e  1960s,  
when t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  l e s s  than  p e r f e c t  d e f e n s e s  would not enhance 
d e t e r r e n c e  b u t ,  i n s t e a d ,  would compl ica te  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  and promote a  
p o t e n t i a l l y  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  arms r a c e .  
31  U.S. P r e s i d e n t ,  1981- (Reagan).  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  S t r a t e g i c  Defense 
~ n i t i y t i v e .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  J a n .  1985. 10 p .  
41 See: Cont roversy  o v e r  S t a r  Wars, P ro :  A View by Col in  S. Gray. The 
~ h r i s F i a n  Sc ience  Monitor,  Aug. 9 ,  1985. p.  16 ,  18.  
This  r e p o r t  i s  meant t o  s e r v e  a s  a  pr imer  on SDI. It b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
compos i t ion ,  fund ing ,  and major  i s s u e s  o f  t h e  SDI. Among t h e  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  
a r e  t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  t h e  r a t e  and l e v e l  o f  fund ing ,  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  and 
m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y ,  arms c o n t r o l ,  NATO A l l i a n c e  r e a c t i o n s  and invo lvement ,  t ech-  
nology t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  Union, and t h e  m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f  s p a c e .  A l l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  appear ing  i n  t h e  paper  i s  from u n c l a s s i f i e d  s o u r c e s .  

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 
STRUCTURE 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  beginning new programs, t h e  SDI conso l ida t ed  and expanded 
s e v e r a l  r e sea rch  e f f o r t s  t h a t  were being conducted s e p a r a t e l y  and wi th  d i f f e r -  
e n t  emphases w i th in  t h e  var ious  armed s e r v i c e s  o r  under t h e  Defense Advanced 
Research P r o j e c t s  Agency (DARPA). I n  March of 1984, L ieu tenant  General  James 
A. Abrahamson was named Di rec to r  of t h e  new SDI Organiza t ion  (SDIO) and g iven  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  focuss ing  and coo rd ina t ing  SDI program a c t i v i t i e s .  H e  r e -  
p o r t s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  Sec re t a ry  of Defense. 
A s  envisaged by t h e  SDIO, t h e  research  program would c o s t  on t h e  o r d e r  of  
$26 b i l l i o n ,  over  a f i v e  t o  seven year  per iod ,  l e ad ing  t o  a d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1990s on whether o r  not t o  proceed with development. A s  w e l l  a s  he ightened  v i s -  
i b i l i t y ,  t h e  program e n t a i l s  cons iderab ly  more r e sea rch  i n  both b read th  and fund- 
i ng  than  t h e  e a r l i e r ,  d i saggrega ted  e f f o r t .  - 5 1  
The SDI i s  organized i n t o  f i v e  r e sea rch  program elements.  The funding l e v e l s  
f o r  t he se  elements  p lus  SDIO headquar te rs  management a r e  a s  fol lows:  
5/  One e s t i m a t e  i s  t h a t  t h e  Defense Department would have been a l l o c a t e d  
about-$12 b i l l i o n  f o r  research  and development on b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  defense  f o r  
t h e  same t ime per iod had t h e  SDI not  been formed. See: U.S. Congress. O f f i c e  
of Technology Assessment. B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Defense Technologies.  Appendix F: 
BMD and t h e  M i l i t a r y  R&D Budget. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  Sept .  1985. 
p. 292-293. And: U.S. Congressional  Budget Of f i ce .  Analysis  of t h e  Cos ts  of 
t h e  Adminis t ra t ion ' s  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e ,  1985-1989. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. P r i n t .  Off. ,  May 1984. 19 p. 
CRS -6 
FY 85 FY86 FY 86 FY87 
Appropr ia t ion  - a /  Request a /  A p p r o p r i a t i o n  a / , b /  P r o j e c t e d  a /  - - - - 
S u r v e i l l a n c e ,  A c q u i s i t i o n ,  
Track ing ,  and K i l l  Assessment 546 1,386 
Di rec ted  Energy Weapons 
Technology 
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Technology 
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and Kev Technologies  
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Management 8  9 
TOTAL 1,397 3 ,721 
Source:  U.S. Dept.  o f  Defense.  
a /  I n  m i l l i o n s  of  d o l l a r s .  - 
b/ A l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  funds  was l e f t  t o  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  SDIO. - 
- -- - - - - - 
A b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  each program element f o l l o w s .  61 - 
SURVEILLANCE, ACQUISITION, TRACKING, AND KILL ASSESSMENT (SATKA) 
The o b j e c t i v e  of  t h i s  program element i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  s e n s i n g  technolo-  
g i e s  t h a t  can p rov ide  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  a c t i v a t e  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  sys tem,  manage t h e  
b a t t l e ,  and a s s e s s  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  f o r c e s  b e f o r e  and d u r i n g  a  d e f e n s e  engagement. 
Space,  a i r ,  and ground-based t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  b e i n g  explored t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  
f u n c t  i o n s .  
6/  F u l l  d e t a i l s  may b e  found i n  U.S. Dept. of  Defense.  S t r a t e g i c  Defense 
1 n i t  i a t i v e  O r g a n i z a t i o n .  Report  t o  t h e  Congress on t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i  t i a -  
t i v e ,  1985. Washington, 1985. p. 23-74. 
CRS - 7 
The most c h a l l e n g i n g  t a s k  f o r  SATKA a p p e a r s  t o  be  deve lop ing  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  among enemy warheads,  decoys ,  and c h a f f  d u r i n g  t h e  mid-course  and 
e a r l y  t e r m i n a l  phases o f  t h e i r  t r a j e c t o r i e s .  The number o f  o b j e c t s  r e q u i r i n g  a t  
l e a s t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  could  be i n  t h e  t e n s  o f  thousands  d u r i n g  a  f u l l - s c a l e  n u c l e a r  
a t t a c k .  Without t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  i d e n t i f y  warheads ,  a n  SDI-derived sys tem would, 
a t  a  minimum, need t o  be more powerful  and e x t e n s i v e ,  which cou ld  b e  p r o h i b i t i v e l y  
expens ive .  
P a s s i v e ,  a c t i v e ,  and i n t e r a c t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  a r e  be ing  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  t a r g e t  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  P a s s i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  i n v o l v e  d e t e c t i n g  r a d i a t i o n  ( e . g . ,  l i g h t  o r  
h e a t )  t h a t  emanates from t h e  t a r g e t .  Ac t ive  t e c h n i q u e s  ( e . g . ,  u s i n g  l a s e r s  o r  
r a d a r )  i n v o l v e  a n a l y z i n g  r e t u r n  s i g n a l s  from r a d i a t i o n  s e n t  t o  t h e  t a r g e t .  
And, i n t e r a c t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  i n v o l v e  d i r e c t i n g  r a d i a t i o n  o r  m a t e r i a l  a t  t h e  o f -  
f e n s i v e  t h r e a t  t o  s t r i p  away e s s e n t i a l l y  a l l  b u t  t h e  s h i e l d e d ,  heavy warheads.  
T h i s  program element i s  des igned  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  u s i n g  l a s e r s  
and /o r   article beams f o r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e .  D i r e c t e d  e n e r g y  weapons 
can  d e l i v e r  t h e i r  d e s t r u c t i v e  energy t o  t a r g e t s  a t  o r  nea r  t h e  speed o f  l i g h t ,  
making them e s p e c i a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  u s e  a g a i n s t  m i s s i l e s  a s  t h e y  
r i s e  th rough  t h e  atmosphere--the boos t  and post -boost  phases  o f  a s c e n t .  
S u c c e s s f u l  engagement o f  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e s e  i n i t i a l  phases  cou ld  a l l o w  t h e  
d e f e n s e  t o  d e s t r o y  m i s s i l e s  b e f o r e  t h e y  r e l e a s e  m u l t i p l e  warheads on t h e i r  own 
independent  t r a j e c t o r i e s  . The c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  such a  d e f e n s i v e  
advan tage  i s  key t o  t h e  SDI c o n c e p t .  
Beam weapon c o n c e p t s  now be ing  s t u d i e d  i n c l u d e  space-based l a s e r s ,  ground- 
based l a s e r s  u s i n g  o r b i t i n g  r e l a y  m i r r o r s ,  space-based n e u t r a l  p a r t i c l e  beams, 
and endo-atmospheric ( w i t h i n  atmosphere) charged p a r t i c l e  beams guided by 
low-power l a s e r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e s e a r c h  on beam g e n e r a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  
advancements a r e  a l s o  sought  i n  beam c o n t r o l ,  o p t i c s ,  f i r e  c o n t r o l ,  and acqui-  
s i t i o n ,  p o i n t i n g ,  and t r a c k i n g  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  - 7 /  
This  program element i n v o l v e s  r e s e a r c h  on some o f  t h e  most ma ture  tech-  
n o l o g i e s  under i n v e s t i g a t i o n  by  t h e  SDIO. K i n e t i c  energy weapons d e s t r o y  
t h e i r  t a r g e t s  b y  impact r a t h e r  than  by a n  e x p l o s i o n .  The g o a l  o f  t h i s  program 
i s  t o  s t u d y  ways t o  a c c u r a t e l y  d i r e c t  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  o b j e c t s  a t  v e r y  h igh  
v e l o c i t i e s  t o  i n t e r c e p t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  o r  t h e i r  warheads d u r i n g  any phase 
o f  t h e i r  t r a j e c t o r i e s .  Var ious  means of  p r o p u l s i o n  a r e  be ing  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  
a c h i e v i n g  t h e  v e l o c i t i e s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  t a s k .  
Ground-launched k i n e t i c  energy k i l l  v e h i c l e s  (KKVs) f o r  endo- and exo- 
a tmospher ic  i n t e r c e p t i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  warheads a r e  perhaps  t h e  most advanced of  
t h e  KEW t e c h n o l o g i e s .  Other KEW t e c h n o l o g i e s  under i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n c l u d e  
space-based,  chemically-launched p r o j e c t i l e s  equipped with homing d e v i c e s  
( s o - c a l l e d  "smart rocks" ) ,  and space-based e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  r a i l g u n s .  - 8/  
S t u d i e s  performed under t h i s  program element i n v e s t i g a t e  o p t i o n s  f o r  
d e f e n s i v e  a r c h i t e c t u r e s  t h a t ,  accord ing  t o  SDIO, a r e  des igned t o  a l l o w  f o r  
7 /  For f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  of  Congress.  Congress iona l  
~ e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e .  Weapons Research:  S t a t u s  and Outlook.  Report  no.  85-183 
SPRY by Cosmo DiMaggio. 1985. 47 p .  
8 /  U.S. Dept. o f  Defense,  Report t o  Congress ,  p.  24, 51-59. - 
e v e n t u a l  deployment o f  a  " h i g h l y  r e s p o n s i v e ,  u l t r a  r e l i a b l e ,  s u r v i v a b l e ,  endur- 
a b l e ,  and c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  b a t t l e  management/command, c o n t r o l ,  and communication 
( ~ 3 )  system. ' '  9 /  F a c t o r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  i n  d e s i g n i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  sys tem c o n c e p t s  - 
i n c l u d e :  m i s s i o n  o b j e c t i v e s  , a n a l y s e s  o f  o f f e n s i v e  t h r e a t s ,  t e c h n i c a l  c a p a b i l -  
i t i e s ,  r i s k ,  and c o s t .  
An o p e r a t i o n a l  sys tem w i l l  r e q u i r e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  au tomat ion  a t  a  l e v e l  be- 
yond c u r r e n t  computer c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o :  1) i d e n t i f y  and t r a c k  a l l  t a r g e t s  from 
launch  u n t i l  t h e y  a r e  d e s t r o y e d ;  2 )  command and c o o r d i n a t e  a l l  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
d e f e n s i v e  sys tem;  and 3 )  a l l o w  f o r  human c o n t r o l  b o t h  p r i o r  t o  and d u r i n g  i t s  
engagement. S ince  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  s o f t w a r e  program, t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
of  d e b i l i t a t i n g  e r r o r s ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  f o r  such a  sys tem 
i s  a  key i s s u e  i n  t h i s  program. R e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l ,  independent  s o f t w a r e  programs 
f o r  d i s t i n c t  BMD components could  l e a d  t o  a  more f a u l t - t o l e r a n t  o v e r a l l  sys tem.  
Examples o f  computer hardware  and s o f t w a r e  advances  sought under SC/BM i n c l u d e  
v e r y  h i g h  speed p r o c e s s i n g ,  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  computer w r i t t e n  code,  and 
s e l  f  t e s t  and c o r r e c t  i o n  t e c h n i q u e s .  
A f a c i l i t y  c a l l e d  t h e  Na t iona l  Tes t  Bed i s  planned f o r  s i m u l a t i n g  and e v a l u -  
a t i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  a r c h i t e c t u r e  and b a t t l e  management c o n c e p t s .  Should t h e  United 
S t a t e s  d e c i d e  t o  deve lop  and d e p l o y  an SDI-derived d e f e n s e ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Test  Bed 
could  be  modi f i ed  t o  a l l o w  f o r  t e s t  and e v a l u a t i o n  o f  a c t u a l  sys tem components. 
T h i s  program element p r o v i d e s  s u p p o r t i n g  r e s e a r c h  and t echno logy  deve lop-  
ment t o  improve system e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and t o  s a t i s f y  sys tem l o g i s t i c a l  r e q u i r e -  
men ts .  The s u r v i v a b i l i t y  and l e t h a l i t y  s t u d y  e f f o r t s  a r e  des igned  t o  y i e l d  
9 /  U.S. Dept. of  Defense ,  Report t o  Congress ,  p .  25. - 
i n f o r m a t i o n  about t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  expec ted  enemy t h r e a t  a s  w e l l  a s  about t h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  an  SDI-derived sys tem t o  s u r v i v e  e f f o r t s  t o  d e s t r o y  o r  d e f e a t  i t .  
R e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  d r i v e  component and system requ i rements .  
Work on suppor t ing  t e c h n o l o g i e s  i n c l u d e s ,  f o r  example, r e s e a r c h  i n  space  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  space  power, on-orbi t  ma in tenance ,  and energy s t o r a g e  and con- 
v e r s i o n .  SDI l o g i s t i c a l  r e s e a r c h ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  concern ing  t h e  space-based 
a s s e t s  o f  an  e v e n t u a l  sys tem,  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  and r e -  
ducing deployment and o p e r a t i o n s  c o s t s .  101 -
101 U.S. Dept. o f  Defense ,  Report t o  Congress ,  p .  25 ,  67-74. -
RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 
The fo l lowing  e f f o r t s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  SDI i n  t h a t  t h e y  would l i k e l y  pro- 
v i d e  i n f o r m a t i o n  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  development o f ,  o r  become components o f ,  a  b a l l i s -  
t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  sys tem.  They a r e  c o o r d i n a t e d  wi th  t h e  SDIO, b u t  no t  inc luded  
i n  SDI funding f i g u r e s .  
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) WORK 
DOE c u r r e n t l y  c o n d u c t s  n u c l e a r  weapons r e s e a r c h  t h a t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  SDI 
($224.1 m i l l i o n  was a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  t h i s  i n  FY85, and $307.1 m i l l i o n  was r e -  
ques ted  f o r  FY86). The most p u b l i c i z e d  e f f o r t  underway i s  t h e  q u e s t  f o r  a n  
x-ray l a s e r  powered by a  low-yield n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n .  Proponents  o f  t h i s  
weapon concept  (most n o t a b l y ,  Edward T e l l e r  , one o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  hydrogen bomb 
d e s i g n e r s )  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  w i l l  become a  key element o f  a  boos t -phase  d e f e n s i v e  
l a y e r .  Others  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i f  t h e  x-ray l a s e r  proves  t o  b e  workab le ,  more l i k e l y  
i t  w i l l  be  a  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  use  i n  mid-course d e f e n s e .  The p r imary  f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  
d e b a t e  i s  t h e  amount o f  t ime  r e q u i r e d  f o r  l aunch ing  t h e  x-ray l a s e r  i n t o  p o s i t i o n  
b e f o r e  i t  can be aimed and f i r e d .  I f  t h e  United S t a t e s  c o n t i n u e s  t o  a b i d e  by  
e x i s t i n g  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  i n  peace t ime ,  t h e n  i t  could  not  b e  launched u n t i l  
j u s t  p r i o r  t o  use  i n  a c t u a l  b a t t l e  because  t h e  Outer  Space T r e a t y  p r o h i b i t s  s t a -  
t i o n i n g  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i v e s  i n  space .  l l /  It remains  t o  be  s e e n ,  however,  *e the r  - 
t h e  n u c l e a r  pumped x-ray w i l l  become workable .  
111 T r e a t y  on P r i n c i p l e s  Governing t h e  A c t i v i t i e s  o f  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  Explora-  
t i o n  and Use of  Outer Space,  I n c l u d i n g  t h e  Moon and Other C e l e s t i a l  Bodies .  
A r t i c l e  I V .  
DOE i s  a l s o  c o n s i d e r i n g  o t h e r  n u c l e a r  pumped ( o r  f u e l e d )  weapon concep t s  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  SDI but h a s  no t  d i s c u s s e d  t h e s e  i n  an u n c l a s s i f i e d  fo rmat .  
According t o  t h e  SDIO, t h e s e  e f f o r t s  a r e  l a r g e l y  des igned t o  m a i n t a i n  a  hedge 
a g a i n s t  comparable Sov ie t  development,  r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r  competing wi th  o t h e r  
near-term concep t s  more c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  SDI. 
I n  a d d i t  i o n  t o  weapons development,  WE i s  a1  so conduct ing s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
s t u d i e s  and t h r e a t  a s sessments  v i a  n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g  and computer s i m u l a t i o n  
model ing.  Such i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  used f o r  d e f i n i n g  c e r t a i n  SDI t echno logy  
r e s e a r c h  requ i rements .  121  -
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (ASATs) 
The United S t a t e s  h a s  an  a c t i v e  ASAT r e s e a r c h  and technology development 
program focused on an a i r  launched m i n i a t u r e  homing v e h i c l e  (MHV). The MHV is  
c u r r e n t l y  undergoing f l i g h t  t e s t s  launched from an F-15. To d a t e ,  two t e s t s  
o f  t h i s  system have been conducted a g a i n s t  a  p o i n t  i n  space  and one a g a i n s t  a  
U.S. s a t e l l i t e .  The t e s t  r e s u l t s  and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  f o r  t h e  program 
have been mixed. 
ASAT r e s e a r c h  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  de fense  i n  s e v e r a l  ways. 
F i r s t ,  some o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  meet t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  bo th  a r e  s i m -  
i l a r .  For example, d i r e c t e d  energy weapon c o n c e p t s  be ing  r e s e a r c h e d  under t h e  
SDI may v e r y  w e l l  a t t a i n  c a p a b i l i t y  u s e f u l  f o r  ASATs i n  t h e  nea r  f u t u r e .  Second, 
ASAT weapons probably  would p l a y  a  key r o l e  i n  enhancing t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  an  
121 For more i n f o r m a t i o n  on SDI-related a c t i v i t i e s  o f  DOE,  s e e  U. S. 
~ i b r a F  of Congress .  Congress ional  Research S e r v i c e .  The E f f e c t  o f  a  Cornpre- 
h e n s i v e  Tes t  Ban on t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e .  Repor t .  no .  85-972 SPR, 
Cosmo DiMaggio. Washington, 1985. 5  p .  
SDI-derived d e f e n s e  sys tem.  F i n a l l y ,  arms c o n t r o l  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  each a r e  
i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i n k e d .  - 131 
I n  1983, t h e  United S t a t e s  began a  p r o j e c t ,  j o i n t l y  managed by DOE, DARPA, 
and t h e  Na t iona l  Aeronau t i c s  and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  (NASA), t o  d e v e l o p  a com- 
pac t  n u c l e a r  power sys tem f o r  use  i n  s p a c e  c a l l e d  t h e  SP-100 program. Although 
des igned  f o r  b o t h  commercial and m i l i t a r y  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  h a s  a t t a i n e d  
new s i g n i f i c a n c e  because  o f  t h e  h i g h  e l e c t r i c  power r e q u i r e m e n t s  e n v i s i o n e d  f o r  
some o f  t h e  space-based components o f  a  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  sys tem.  The 
SDIO h a s  s i n c e  t aken  t h e  p l a c e  o f  DARPA i n  t h i s  e f f o r t .  The d e s i g n ,  f a b r i c a t i o n ,  
and t e s t i n g  o f  a  groundlbased l i th ium-coo led  r e a c t o r  i s  scheduled t o  b e g i n  i n  
FY86 and run through about FY91 o r  FY92. The c u r r e n t  p l a n  c a l l s  f o r  a  space-  
based p r o t o t y p e  by  t h e  mid-1990s. They FY86 a p p r o p r i a t i o n  t o  DOE f o r  t h e  
SP-100 program i s  $15 m i l l i o n .  
OTHERS 
DARPA and t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s  conduct some s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  does  no t  f a l l  under t h e  SDI. Examples o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i n c l u d e  
some ongoing e f f o r t s  i n  t e r m i n a l  d e f e n s e  of  o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  i n  s t r a t e g i c  a i r  
d e f e n s e ,  and i n  ways t o  c o u n t e r  Sov ie t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s .  Concepts  a r i s i n g  
131 For more i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h i s  t o p i c ,  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  o f  Congress .  
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  Research S e r v i c e .  ASATs: A n t i s a t e l l i t e  Weapon Systems.  I s s u e  
B r i e f  no .  IB85176, by Ar thur  F. Manfredi ,  J r . ,  Cosmo DiMaggio, and Marcia  
Smith,  Oct . 1, 1985 ( c o n t i n u a l l y  u p d a t e d ) .  Washington,  1985. 2 3  p .  
from these efforts would most likely be integrated with an SDI-derived system 
if a decision to proceed with such a system were reached. Also, the SDIO has 
established both formal and informal mechanisms with NASA to coordinate and 
exchange technical information on space science and space shuttle-related 
experiments. 
SDI ARCHITECTURE 
SDI, a s  a  b a s i c  r e s e a r c h  program, i s  no t  supposed t o  pre- judge what de fen-  
s i v e  c o n c e p t s  a r e  o r  a r e  not  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  cannot  be 
wedded t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  sys tem d e s i g n .  However, i t s  l a c k  o f  a n  o v e r a l l  concept  
d e f i n i t i o n  h a s  f r u s t r a t e d  p roponen t s  and c r i t i c s  a l i k e .  The SDIO i s  working 
t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h i s  pr'oblem. Ten a r c h i t e c t u r e  s t u d y  teams under c o n t r a c t  t o  
SDIO have completed t h e  f i r s t  phase o f  sys tem d e s i g n  s t u d i e s .  SDIO h a s  r e c e n t l y  
s e l e c t e d  f i v e  c o n t r a c t o r  teams t o  c o n t i n u e  working i n t o  t h e  next  phase  o f  s t u d y .  
These teams a r e  headed by S p a r t a ,  TRW, Sc ience  A p p l i c a t i o n s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corp. ,  
Rockwell I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  and Mar t in -Mar ie t t a  Aerospace .  
The SDIO r e c e n t l y  d i s c u s s e d  an u n c l a s s i f i e d  v e r s i o n  of  t h e  p r e s e n t l y  favored 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l  d e s i g n  wi th  t h e  New York Times. 14/  The c u r r e n t  concep t  would -
c o n s i s t  o f  seven rough ly  independent  l a y e r s  of  d e f e n s i v e  i n t e r c e p t o r s .  I d e a l l y ,  
each l a y e r  would be des igned  t o  permit  no more t h a n  about 20 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
o f f e n s i v e  t a r g e t s  t o  p a s s  through i t .  T h i s  concept  c a l l s  f o r  two l a y e r s  o f  
weapons t o  a t t a c k  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e i r  boos t  phase (one  o f  d i r e c t e d  e n e r g y  weapons 
and one o f  k i n e t i c  ene rgy  weapons);  t h r e e  l a y e r s  o f  weapons t o  a t t a c k  warheads 
i n  t h e  mid-course phase (one each s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  boos t  p h a s e ,  p l u s  one 
of  undetermined c h a r a c t e r  such a s  ground-based l a s e r s  o r  d e v i c e s  t h a t  f i r e  masses  
of p e l l e t s  o r  a e r o s o l s ) ;  and two l a y e r s  o f  ground-based r o c k e t  i n t e r c e p t o r s  t o  
contend w i t h  any warheads g e t t i n g  through t o  t h e  t e r m i n a l  phase .  
141 Mohr , C h a r l e s .  A n t i m i s s i l e  P lan  Seeks Thousands o f  Space Weapons. 
New Y G ~  Times, Nov. 3 ,  1985. p .  1 , 1 8 .  
Although t h e  a r c h i t e c t u r e  d e s c r i b e d  above i s  c u r r e n t l y  f a v o r e d ,  t echno log-  
i c a l  and /o r  p o l i t i c a l  developments may a l t e r  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  scheme o v e r  t ime .  
With t h i s  i n  mind, SDIO i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n c e p t s  u s i n g  d i f f e r i n g  
numbers and l o c a t i o n s  of  t h e  l a y e r s .  For  now, however, SDIO b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  
seven  l a y e r  concep t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  b e s t  s o l u t i o n  f o r  accompl ishing SDI m i s s i o n  
o b j e c t i v e s  . 
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS 
A key i s s u e  f o r  t h e  SDI i s  "how w i l l  we know whether i t  i s  a  s u c c e s s ? "  
The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  proposed two c r i t e r i a  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and c o n c e p t s  t h a t  might b e  d e r i v e d  from t h e  SDI. 
A s  enumerated by S p e c i a l  Advisor t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  Paul  H. N i t z e ,  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  
a r e  t h a t  a d e f e n s i v e  sys tem must b e :  1 )  s u r v i v a b l e  and 2) c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a t  
t h e  marg in .  151 Of c o u r s e ,  a n  a d d i t i o n a l ,  i n h e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  i s  t h a t  t h e  -
sys tem be e f f e c t i v e  i n  performing i t s  in tended  f u n c t i o n .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
c o n t e n d s  t h a t  a  system t h a t  mee t s  i t s  two c r i t e r i a  would, i f  d e p l o y e d ,  promote 
s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y  between t h e  n u c l e a r  superpowers .  161 - 
A b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  each c r i t e r i o n  f o l l o w s .  
EFFECTIVENESS 
Before  a  d e c i s i o n  t o  proceed wi th  f u l l  s c a l e  e n g i n e e r i n g  development and 
deployment can  be made, t h e r e  must e x i s t  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  
sys tem,  once i n  p l a c e ,  w i l l  be  c a p a b l e  of  d e s t r o y i n g  oncoming enemy b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e s  o r  t h e i r  r e - e n t r y  v e h i c l e s .  Given t h e  unavo idab le  d e l a y  between R&D 
and deployment ,  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  must b e  judged v e r s u s  an  a n t i c i p a t e d  t h r e a t  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  one faced a t  d e c i s i o n  t ime .  T h i s  c r i t e r i o n  r a i s e s  a t  l e a s t  
151 N i t z e ,  Paul  H.  On t h e  Road t o  a  More S t a b l e  Peace .  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
~ e ~ a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e ,  Feb. 20,  1985. 
161 U.S. Dept . o f  S t a t e .  The S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e .  S p e c i a l  
~ e ~ o r t ~ o .  129. Washington,  June 1985. 5 p .  
two as yet unanswered questions: 1) What total level of effectiveness is de- 
sired?; and 2) How is the actual system effectiveness to be measured or esti- 
mated ahead of time to yield the confidence necessary for making a development 
and deployment decision? 
SURVIVABILITY 
Strategic defenses must be able to survive a direct attack that might be 
launched just prior to or during a ballistic missile assault. Space-based sys- 
tems are particularly vulnerable to such an attack. Hence, SDIO is concentrat- 
ing its survivability efforts on projected space-based elements of a hypothetical 
defensive architecture. Typical survival techniques include shielding, distanc- 
ing the system from its potential attackers, maneuvering, proliferating, and 
shooting back. However, these and other techniques are not trivial to imple- 
ment. Survivability represents one of the major technical challenges of the 
SDI. In addressing this challenge, two critical questions must be resolved: 
1) Can sensitive elements of a layered strategic defense (e.g., sensors, c3 
hardware, and reflecting mirrors) be made survivable?; and 2) Can they be made 
survivable at a cost that does not encourage proliferation of attack weapons 
to beat the system? 
COST 
A goal of SDIO is to develop an effective strategic defense for the least 
cost. However, the Administration has stated a more stringent cost criterion 
for SDI, namely that "new defensive systems must be cost effective at the margin-- 
that is, they must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so 
that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to 
overcome t h e  d e f e n s e . "  - 171 T h i s  c r i t e r i o n  r a i s e s  s e v e r a l  q u e s t i o n s .  S i n c e  
an  e n t i r e  system cannot  b e  deployed i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y ,  i s  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  t o  b e  
a p p l i e d  f o r  each phase o f  deployment o r  o n l y  a f t e r  a  complete  sys tem i s  i n  
p l a c e ?  How, i f  a t  a l l ,  a r e  n o n - q u a n t i f i a b l e s  l i k e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  t o  s o c i e t y  
o f  e i t h e r  hav ing  o r  n o t  hav ing  a  d e f e n s i v e  system f a c t o r e d  i n ?  How w i l l  an  ad- 
v e r s a r y ' s  c o s t s  be  determined and what f a c t o r s  w i l l  comprise  t h e i r  c o s t s ?  To 
what d e g r e e  do we r e l y  upon an a d v e r s a r y ' s  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a  r a t i o n a l  economic 
p o s i t  i o n ?  Can we expec t  t h a t  i f  i n i t i a l l y  s a t i s f i e d ,  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  w i l l  remain  
s a t i s f i e d  o v e r  t ime? 
STABILITY 
Even i f  t h e  SDI shows t h a t  a  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  
u l t i m a t e l y  i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e ,  g e n e r a l l y  i t  i s  agreed t h a t  f o r  some extended 
p e r i o d  o f  t ime  (pe rhaps  decades  o r  l o n g e r )  d e t e r r e n c e  would n e c e s s a r i l y  r e l y  on 
a  mix o f  o f f e n s i v e  and d e f e n s i v e  weapons. Managing t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from o f  fen- 
s i v e l y  t o  d e f e n s i v e l y  dominated d e t e r r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s ,  such t h a t ,  th roughout  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  n e i t h e r  s i d e  h a s  o r  i s  pe rce ived  t o  have  an i n c e n t i v e  t o  s t r i k e  t h e  
o t h e r ,  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t .  Quest ions  r e g a r d i n g  s t a b i l i t y  must b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a l -  
most c o n t i n u o u s l y .  A r m s  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and c o n t r o l  w i l l  l i k e l y  have  t o  p l a y  v i t a l  
r o l e s  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  s t a b i l i t y  through t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n .  SDIO and o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  
a n a l y s t s  a r e  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  how s t a b i l i t y  cou ld  be main ta ined  under  a  v a r i e t y  o f  
s c e n a r i o s ,  assuming c e r t a i n  t e c h n i c a l  b reak th roughs  i n  both  o f f e n s i v e  and defen-  
s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  Before  pol icymakers  can  a s s e s s  t h e  impact o f  SDI on p r e s e n t  
and f u t u r e  s t a b i l i t y  t h e y  must unders tand and s c r u t i n i z e  t h e  assumpt ions  t h a t  
171 ~ i t z e ,  Paul H. On t h e  Road t o  a  More S t a b l e  Peace .  p .  2 .  - 
d r i v e  SDI s c e n a r i o s .  For example, s c e n a r i o  outcomes can v a r y  c o n s i d e r a b l y  de- 
pending upon assumpt ions  o f  U.S. and Sov ie t  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e s  and t h e i r  l e v e l s  
of  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  
A DECISION I N  THE EARLY 1990s 
According t o  t h e  Reagan Adminis t ra t ion ,  t h e  SDI r e sea rch  program w i l l  
provide t h e  t e c h n i c a l  knowledge i n  t h e  e a r l y  1990s necessary  t o  suppor t  a  
d e c i s i o n  on whether t o  develop and deploy advanced de fens ive  systems. ~ i t t l e  
s p e c i f i c  in format ion  i s  c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  concerning t h e  types  of o p t i o n s  
t h a t  might be presented t o  Congress a t  t h a t  t ime. A popular  misconcept ion i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be on ly  t h r e e  op t ions :  1) h a l t  t h e  SDI e f f o r t  f o r  t e c h n i c a l ,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and/or o t h e r  reasons;  2 )  postpone a  d e c i s i o n  and do more 
research ;  o r ,  3)  move t o  development and deployment of a  system t h a t ,  once i n  
p l ace ,  w i l l  meet a l l  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  de fens ive  needs f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .  
The f i r s t  and second op t ions  a r e  both pos s ib l e  non-deployment outcomes. 
However, t h e  t h i r d  option--"a once and forever"  deployment--is no t  l i k e l y  t o  
be a  r e a l i s t i c  one f o r  t h e  1990s ( i f  eve r ) .  I n s t e a d ,  i t  i s  more l i k e l y  t h a t  
t h e r e  would be a  v a r i e t y  of "pro-deployment" op t ions  f o r  phasing i n  d i f f e r e n t  
s t r a t e g i c  defenses  over time. These a l t e r n a t i v e s  might be based,  i n  p a r t ,  on 
varying assumptions concerning arms c o n t r o l .  Each op t ion  might be presen ted  
with e s t ima te s  of c o s t s ,  r i s k s ,  and degrees  of e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  both f o r  d e t e r r i n g  
an a g r e s s o r ' s  a t t a c k  and f o r  defending aga ins t  an a t t a c k  should d e t e r r e n c e  f a i l .  
An e s s e n t i a l  element of each of t h e s e  op t ions  probably would be a  cont inued ,  
s t rong  r e sea rch  program f o r  enhancing system e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and f o r  hedging 
a g a i n s t  p o t e n t i a l  enemy e f f o r t s  t o  counter  i t .  
A d e c i s i o n  t o  proceed wi th  one of t h e  "pro-deployment" op t ions  would l i k e l y  
lead  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  f u t u r e  op t ions  based on more advanced technologies .  The 
SDIO r e f e r s  t o  t h i s  e v o l u t i o n  o f  d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and s t r a t e g i e s  as t h e  
"path  t o  ' t h o r o u g h l y  r e l i a b l e '  de fenses . "  However, SDI's c r i t i c s  would a rgue  
t h a t  t h i s  p a t h  is  i n h e r e n t l y  u n s t a b l e  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  should no t  b e  t a k e n .  
POLICY ISSUES 
The SDI program h a s  r a i s e d  a  h o s t  o f  i s s u e s ,  many o f  which a r e  r e m i n i s c e n t  
o f  t h o s e  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  1960s b e f o r e  t h e  1972 A n t i - b a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  (ABM) T r e a t y .  
They i n c l u d e  t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ,  f u n d i n g ,  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y ,  
arms c o n t r o l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  a l l i a n c e  r e a c t i o n s ,  t echno logy  t r a n s f e r ,  and t h e  m i l -  
i t a r i z a t  i o n  o f  space .  The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t  i o n s  a d d r e s s  t h e s e  i s s u e s .  
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES 
The t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  d e f e n d i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  c o u n t r y  and t h e  NATO 
a l l i e s  a g a i n s t  a  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  a t t a c k  i s  a  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  o f  t h e  SDI Program. 
S c i e n t i s t s  have been v o c a l  on b o t h  s i d e s  o f  t h i s  i s s u e .  The f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  
d e f e n d i n g  m i l i t a r y  t a r g e t s  such a s  Minuteman s i l o s  i s  somewhat l e s s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,  
w i t h  most o b s e r v e r s  b e l i e v i n g  i t  t o  be a n  e a s i e r  t a s k .  Beyond t h e  i s s u e  o f  
t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  pe r  s e  i s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  panoply  o f  
r e a c t i v e  countermeasures  a v a i l a b l e  t o  p o t e n t i a l  a d v e r s a r i e s .  
There  seems l i t t l e  doubt  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  b r e a k t h r o u g h s  c a n  b e  a n t i c i -  
pated t h a t  w i l l  make s p e c i f i c  e l ements  o f  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s i v e  weapons sys tems  
p o s s i b l e .  But b r e a k t h r o u g h s  a r e  needed i n  many a r e a s .  The q u e s t i o n  i s ,  c a n  
t h e  r e q u i s i t e  v a r i e t y  o f  weapons and s e n s o r s  b e  b rough t  t o g e t h e r  i n t o  a  system--a 
sys tem t h a t  i s  r e l i a b l e ,  under  human c o n t r o l ,  s u r v i v a b l e ,  and c o s t  e f f e c t i v e .  
The s h e e r  s c a l e  o f  t h e  program a r g u e s  t h a t  a n  answer t o  t h a t  q u e s t i o n  now i s  
premature  . 
Severe  a t t a c k  s i t u a t i o n s  would be  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  s t r e s s f u l - m a n y  m i s s i l e s  
( p e r h a p s  t h o u s a n d s ) ,  m o s t l y  w i t h  m u l t i p l e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y - t a r g e t e d  r e e n t r y  
v e h i c l e s ,  launched from b o t h  land and s e a ,  could  ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y )  b e  launched 
a lmost  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  and a r r i v e  on U.S. t a r g e t s  i n  a t  most t h i r t y  m i n u t e s .  
One o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  t e c h n i c a l  c h a l l e n g e s  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  s o f t w a r e  (computer 
c  - e )  t h a t  w i l l  be  needed t o  "manage" t h e  system--the so -ca l l ed  b a t t l e  management 
f u n c t i o n .  181 The t a s k s  i n c l u d e :  d e t e c t i n g  an a t t a c k ,  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  t y p e  -
and s i z e  of  t h e  a t t a c k ,  t r a c k i n g  t h e  t a r g e t s ,  a s s i g n i n g  weapons t o  t h e  t a r g e t s ,  
a s s e s s i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  engagement, and (presumably)  r e a s s i g n i n g  weapons t o  r e -  
p l a c e  f a i l u r e s .  
Many c r i t i c s  q u e s t i o n  whether i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  w r i t e  and check t h e  m i l l i o n s  
o f  l i n e s  o f  computer code needed,  t o  be  s u r e  i t  i s  e r r o r  f r e e .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
o f  c o n c e r n ,  t h e y  a r g u e ,  because  i t  w i l l  be i m p o s s i b l e  t o  t e s t  t h e  code  r e a l i s t i -  
c a l l y ,  and t o  a n t i c i p a t e  f u l l y  a l l  p o s s i b l e  a t t a c k  combinat ions  t o  which t h e  sys -  
tem might b e  exposed.  Proponents  c o u n t e r  t h a t ,  a s  on o t h e r  t e c h n i c a l  q u e s t i o n s ,  
t h e  program now is  j u s t  a  r e s e a r c h  program t o  d e t e r m i n e  f e a s i b i l i t y  and p o s s i b l e  
approaches ,  s o  f a i l u r e  shou ld  no t  b e  assumed. On t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  computer codes ,  
f o r  example, t e c h n i q u e s  such a s  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  p a r a l l e l  p r o c e s s i n g  t o  d e v e l o p  f a u l t  
t o l e r a n t  computer sys tems a r e  b e i n g  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  191 -
Another t e c h n i c a l  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  SDI i s  responding t o  a  h o s t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  
countermeasures  a v a i l a b l e  t o  U.S. a d v e r s a r i e s .  201 They range  from p a s s i v e  -
181 See ,  f o r  example: Snager ,  David E.  A Debate about ' S t a r  Wars '--Can 
~ o f t w z e  Be Designed? New York Times, Oct .  23, 1985,  p. D l ,  D7; P a r n a s ,  David 
Lorge.  Sof tware  Aspects  o f  S t r a t e g i c  Defense Systems.  American S c i e n t i s t ,  
Sept . -0c t .  1985,  p .  432-440; and SDIO Computing O f f i c i a l  Says Sof tware  f o r  SDI 
Can Be Developed, Defense D a i l y ,  Dec. 5 ,  1985, p .  169-170. 
191 For f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  See U.S. L i b r a r y  of Congress.  Congress iona l  
~ e s e a z h  S e r v i c e .  Supercomputers and A r t i f i c i a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e :  Recent Federa l  
I n i t i a t i v e s .  I s s u e  B r i e f  no. IB85105, by Nancy M i l l e r ,  Dec. 12,  1985 ( c o n t i n u a l l y  
u p d a t e d ) .  Washington, 1985. 11 p .  
20/ C a r a v e l l i  , Jack .  Sov ie t  Countermeasures t o  SDI. J o u r n a l  o f  Defense 
& ~ i ~ K m a c ~ ,  Mar. 1985. p.  45-47, 62 .  
countermeasures  t h a t  degrade  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s i v e  sys tem,  
t o  a c t i v e  countermeasures  t h a t  a t t a c k  t h e  sys tem.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  ones  a r e  
l i s t e d  i n  t h e  fo l lowing  t a b l e ,  a long  wi th  p o t e n t i a l  c o u n t e r s  t o  them ( i . e . ,  
coun te r -coun te r  measures)  and comments. 
POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES TO STRATEGIC DEFENSES 
Category 
Ac t ive  
P a s s i v e  
P o t e n t i a l  
Countermeasures 
Defense Suppress ion  
A t t a c k  space  s e n s o r s  
A t  t a c k  space  c o m u n i c a t  i o n s  
A t t a c k  space  weapons 
A t t a c k  ground s i t e s  
P r o l i f e r a t  i o n  
Add ICBMs & SLBMs 
Mobile ICBMs 
Evasion 
Fast -burn b o o s t e r s ,  
b o o s t e r  c o a t i n g s ,  
r o t a t i n g  b o o s t e r s  
Decoy b o o s t e r s  
P e n e t r a t i o n  a i d s  ( p e n a i d s ) ,  
e . g . ,  RV decoys 
Maneuvering RVs (MARVs) 
Avoidance 
S h i f t  t o  " a i r  b r e a t h e r s  , I 1  
i . e . ,  bombers and c r u i s e  
m i s s i l e s  
Emulat ion 
Develop analogous  s t r a -  
t e g i c  d e f e n s i v e  sys tem 
P o t e n t i a l  Counter-  
Countermeasures Comments 
Hardening,  redundancy,  decoys  S o v i e t s  a l r e a d y  
I t  have  some ASAT 
I I c a p a b i l i t y ;  
S e c u r i t y ,  redundancy,  h a r d e n i n g  " a t t a c k "  i n c l u d e s  
b l i n d i n g  and 
j a m  i n g  
Robust d e t e c t i o n  and t r a c k i n g  
sys tem 
S o v i e t s  have 
deployed m o b i l e  
I C B M s  
F a s t  r e a c t  i o n  sys tem,  more A l l  a r e  c o s t l y  t o  
powerful  weapons, o r  t h e  o f f e n s e  ( e . g . ,  
s h i f t  burden t o  l a t e r  added weight o r  p e r -  
t i e r s  formance p e n a l t y  ) 
Good d i s c r i m i n a t  i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  
I I 
Capable i n t e r c e p t o r s  
Enhanced a i r  d e f e n s e  c a p a b i l i -  SDIC! s t u d y i n g  t h i s  
t i e s  problem; d e l i v e r y  
t i m e  f o r  a i r  
b r e a t h e r s  i s  much 
l o n g e r  than  f o r  
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  
A l l  t h e  o t h e r  coun te rmeasures  Presumably a  de- 
i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  column. s i r e d  outcome, i f  
o f f e n s i v e  arms a r e  
reduced 
Given t h e  many p o s s i b l e  countermeasures ,  t h e  SDIO h a s  adopted a s  one of  
i t s  c r i t e r i a  f o r  s u c c e s s  t h e  concept  o f  " c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a t  t h e  margin ."  The 
g o a l  i s  t o  deve lop  a  sys tem t o  which i t  would be  cheaper  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  
t u  add d e f e n s i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  t h a n  i t  would f o r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a d v e r s a r y  t o  add 
t o  i t s  c a p a b i l i t y  v i a  coun te rmeasures .  The d e f e n s i v e  system mus t ,  a s  w e l l ,  be 
a b l e  t o  add c a p a b i l i t y  f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e  o f f e n s e ,  o r  e l s e  i t  could  become tempo- 
r a r i l y  nega ted .  As t h e  above t a b l e  s u g g e s t s ,  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s i v e  system 
must b e  v e r y  r o b u s t  i n  o r d e r  t o  accommodate t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  p o s s i b l e  coun te r -  
measures .  As wi th  many o f  t h e  SDI1s  t e c h n i c a l  c h a l l e n g e ~ ,  i t  i s  not  y e t  known 
whether t h i s  w i l l  be  p o s s i b l e .  To enhance r e s e a r c h  management, t h e  SDIO i s  
us ing  s o - c a l l e d  "Red Teams'' o f  e n g i n e e r s  and s t r a t e g i s t s  t o  h y p o t h e s i z e  poten- 
t i a l  coun te rmeasures .  A l l  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s  must be c r i t i q u e d  by t h e  Red Teams 
and demons t ra te  an a b i l i t y  t o  accomodate t h e  c o u n t e r s  they  advance.  
The r e s u l t s  which w i l l  d e r i v e  from t h e  SDI r e s e a r c h  program a r e  s t i l l  un- 
c e r t a i n .  Yet s u p p o r t e r s  and c r i t i c s  have jo ined  i n  arguments t h a t  a  c a p a b l e  BMD 
system is  p o s s i b l e  o r  i m p o s s i b l e .  I n  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o n t e x t ,  i t  i s  worth  n o t i n g  
t h a t  h i s t o r y  i s  r e p l e t e  w i t h  l e a r n e d  people  e r r o n e o u s l y  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  p o s s i -  
b i l i t y  o r  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  some s c i e n t i f i c  o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  b reak th rough  
by making premature  judgments.  D i s c u s s i o n s  o f  fundamental f e a s i b i l i t y  must of  
n e c e s s i t y  h i n g e  on t h e  p r e c i s e  m i s s i o n  o f  whatever system concept  i s  under con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  ( t h i s  can r a n g e  from a  system t o  defend a  few m i s s i l e  s i l o s  t o  a  sys -  
tem t o  defend t h e  e n t i r e  F ree  World). Some l e v e l  o f  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s i v e  cap- 
a b i l i t y  i s  a l r e a d y  p o s s i b l e .  What i s  not  y e t  c l e a r  i s  whether t h e  SDI w i l l  
l ead  t o  an enhanced s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  t h a t  w i l l  be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e n d e r  "nuc lea r  
weapons impotent  and o b s o l e t e , "  o r  even whether i t  w i l l  be  s u r v i v a b l e ,  c o s t  e f -  
f e c  t i v e  , and b e n e f i c  i a l  . 
RATE OF FUNDING 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s ,  Members o f  Congress ,  and t h e  ~ u b l i c  a t  l a r g e  c u r -  
r e n t l y  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  v iews on t h e  need and o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  t h e  SDI. The range  
o f  o p i n i o n  e x t e n d s  from a minimal program wi th  adherence  t o  t h e  ABM T r e a t y  whi le  
conduc t ing  b a s i c  l a b o r a t o r y  r e s e a r c h  a s  a  hedge a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  b r e a k o u t ,  t o  an  
a c c e l e r a t e d  program aimed a t  development and deployment o f  a  d e f e n s i v e  sys tem a t  
t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  t ime ( t h e  s o - c a l l e d  t echno logy- - ra the r  t h a n  t h e  r e s o u r c e -  
l i m i t e d  approach) .  There  a r e  myriad a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  between.  To d a t e ,  t h e  i s s u e  
o f  how t h e  r a t e  o f  funding s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l a t e s  t o  SDI o b j e c t i v e s  h a s  no t  been 
w e l l  d e f i n e d .  As noted e a r l i e r ,  c u r r e n t  SDIO e s t i m a t e s  a r e  t h a t  t h e  r e s e a r c h  
program w i l l  c o s t  about $26  b i l l i o n  up t o  t h e  f i r s t  deployment d e c i s i o n  
p o i n t  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1990s.  Lower funding l e v e l s  c o u l d  d e l a y  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  p o i n t .  
Cost e s t i m a t e s  f o r  a  deployed sys tem a r e  h i g h l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  and depend on c r i t i -  
c a l  assumpt ions  on t h e  t y p e  o f  sys tem b e i n g  c o s t e d .  Some r a n g e  from s e v e r a l  
hundred b i l l i o n  t o  over  1$ t r i l l i o n .  21/ - 
Even t h o s e  opposed t o  t h e  SDI g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  some form and l e v e l  
o f  r e s e a r c h  i n  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  i s  war ran ted .  Accord ing ly ,  even w i t h o u t  t h e  
SDI program, t h e  funding l e v e l  i n  t h i s  a r e a  would n o t  go t o  z e r o .  Such a  min i -  
mal funding s c e n a r i o  would e s s e n t i a l l y  r e v e r t  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  P r e s i -  
d e n t  Reagan's  speech i n  March o f  1983. It c a n  b e  argued t h a t  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  t o  
be m a i n t a i n e d ,  t h i s  s c e n a r i o  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  have t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  moni to r  Sov ie t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  e f f o r t s  t o  e n s u r e  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  n e g a t i n g  
t h e  d e t e r r e n t  v a l u e  o f  o u r  o f f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s .  It presumably a l s o  
21/ See ,  f o r  example: Adam, John A. and John Horgan. ~ e b a t i n g  t h e  
issuer IEEE Spectrum, S e p t .  1985,  p.  56 and S c h l e s i n g e r ,  James R .  R h e t o r i c  
and R e a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  S t a r  War Debate.  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y ,  Summer 1985. p .  4. 
assumes t h a t ,  f o r  long-term s t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
must a g r e e  t o  meaningful  arms r e d u c t i o n s ,  o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  must f i n d  o t h e r  
ways t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  problem o f  ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  
The shor t - t e rm funding requ i rements  o f  t h i s  "monitoring" s c e n a r i o  appear  
t o  be  f a r  l e s s  than  t h o s e  proposed by t h e  SDIO i n  p u r s u i t  o f  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e .  
And, i t  can  be argued t h a t  i f  a  u s e f u l  BMD should  prove t e c h n i c a l l y  unach ievab le ,  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  w i l l  have been saved .  However, i t  would be wrong t o  
assume t h a t  because  t h e  r i s k s  i n  t a k i n g  t h i s  approach a r e  not  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t ,  
t h a t  t h e y ,  i n  f a c t ,  a r e  s m a l l e r  than  t h o s e  o f  t h e  pro-SDI o p t i o n s .  A l l  o p t i o n s  
i n c l u d e  t h e  r i s k  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons use  f o r  many y e a r s .  
Those i n  f a v o r  o f  SDI do n o t  a l l  have t h e  same concept  of  what SDI could  
o r  should  accomplish .  Fur thermore ,  proponents  v a r y  i n  t h e i r  a s sessments  a s  t o  
how much funding i s  r e q u i r e d  and a t  what r a t e  t o  meet t h e i r  own o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  
t h e  program. In  a  world o f  countermeasures  and coun te r -coun te rmeasures ,  t ime  
might be  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t o r  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t e c h n i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y .  The r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  between SDI g o a l s  and funding can be  s t a t e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  
I f  t h e  g o a l  o f  t h e  SDI i s  t o  r a p i d l y  proceed wi th  r e s e a r c h  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  deve lop  and d e p l o y ,  u n i l a t e r a l l y  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  a  sys tem t h a t  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  ahead o f  o f f e n s i v e  countermeasures  such t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  an  e f -  
f e c t i v e  d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  o f f e n s i v e  t h r e a t  t h a t  i s  i n  p l a c e  a t  t h e  t ime  
o f  deployment,  then  SDI p robab ly  must be  funded a t  a  h i g h  r a t e ,  even p r i o r  t o  
a s s e s s i n g  t h e  program's s u c c e s s .  This  s c e n a r i o  p l a c e s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  burden on 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  development,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  absence o f  arms agreements  o r  o t h e r  
s o l u t i o n s  l i m i t i n g  t h e  o f f e n s i v e  t h r e a t  over  t i m e .  However, i t s  a p p e a l  d e r i v e s  
p r i m a r i l y  from t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  i t  h o l d s  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  t o  
l ead  t h e  superpowers t o  a  more s t r a t e g i c a l l y  s t a b l e  p o s i t i o n .  T h i s  s c e n a r i o  
could  r e q u i r e  an  ongoing,  f a s t  paced,  highly-funded program f o r  c o n t i n u a l l y  
enhancing system e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  presumed r i g o r o u s  s o v i e t  e f f o r t s  
t o  c o u n t e r  d e f e n s e s .  
I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  need f o r  some SDI-derived b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  e x i s t s ,  b u t  i s  n o t  i m i n e n t  ( i . e . ,  i f  s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y  i s  
not  g r e a t l y  t h r e a t e n e d  i n  t h e  n e a r  term w i t h o u t  such a  s y s t e m ) ,  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t s  can be r e a l i z e d  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e  r e d u c t i o n s  and 
v e r i f i a b l e  agreements on development and deployment o f  d e f e n s i v e  s y s t e m s ,  t h e n  
t h e  p o s s i b l i t ~  e x i s t s  f o r  s lowing t h e  r a t e  o f  funding from an a l l  o u t  t e c h n o l -  
ogy- l imi ted  pace .  However, g i v e n  t h e  premise  t h a t  new s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  w i l l  
e v e n t u a l l y  be  needed f o r  s t a b i l i t y ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  fund ing  shou ld  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  f a c t o r s  above and should  no t  be  slowed by r e s o u r c e  c o n s t r a i n t s  a l o n e .  
I f  i t  were ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  would r u n  t h e  r i s k  o f  f a l l i n g  beh ind  t h e  S o v i e t s  
bo th  o f f e n s i v e l y  and d e f e n s i v e l y ,  s e r i o u s l y  l i m i t i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  SDI e v e r  t o  
d e v e l o p  a  sys tem t h a t  would b e  e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  a n  everchang ing  s t r a t e g i c  t h r e a t .  
Both o f  t h e s e  pro-SDI s c e n a r i o s  seem t o  d i c t a t e  t h e  need f o r  l a r g e  near-  
term funding t o  accomplish  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s .  I f  t h e  assumpt ions  beh ind  t h e s e  
s c e n a r i o s  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  t h e n  a  d e c i s i o n  t o  pursue  e i t h e r  o p t i o n  w i t h o u t  appro- 
p r i a t e  funding would l i k e l y  doom them t o  f a i l u r e .  None the less ,  t h e  i s s u e  of 
what c o n s t i t u t e s  a p p r o p r i a t e  funding f o r  e i t h e r  c a s e  remains  u n r e s o l v e d .  
STRATEGIC POLICY/MILITARY UTILITY 
The s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  and m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  SDI a r e  a s  y e t  
a r g u a b l e  because  they  depend on f o u r  s p e c u l a t i v e  i s s u e s :  1 )  t h e  t y p e  o f  s t r a -  
t e g i c  d e f e n s e  system t h a t  w i l l  be  dep loyed ,  i t s  p r imary  m i s s i o n ,  and i t s  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ;  2) t h e  e v o l u t i o n  and compos i t ion  o f  S o v i e t  o f f e n s i v e  and 
d e f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ;  3 )  arms c o n t r o l  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  p l a c e  a t  t h a t  t i m e ;  
and 4)  t h e  impact o f  both  U.S. and Sov ie t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  on U.S. s t r a t e g i c  
o b j e c t i v e s  and s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y .  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan b e l i e v e s  t h a t  we can d.evelop s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
t h a t  can d e s t r o y  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  i n  f l i g h t ,  t h u s  e i i m i n a t i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
u t i l i t y  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons and ending U.S. r e l i a n c e  on t h e  s t r a t e g i c  d o c t r i n e  of  
d e t e r r e n c e  by t h r e a t  0 5  r e t a l i a t i o n .  These d e f e n s e s ,  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
a r g u e s ,  w i l l  l ead  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  by  r e n d e r i n g  
n u c l e a r  weapons "impotent  and o b s o l e t e  ." The superpowers would no longer  
compete i n  2 n u c l e a r  arms r a c e  and n e i t h e r  s i d e  would have an i n c e n t i v e  t o  
a t t a c k  t h e  o t h e r  i n  a  c r i s i s .  2 2 1  -
O t h e r s ,  however, be1 i e v e  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  can deve lop ,  a t  b e s t ,  
a  p a r t i a l  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  sys tem env i s ioned  by P r e s i d e n t  
Reagan. Limited d e f e n s e  sys tems could  defend a g a i n s t  a c c i d e n t a l  o r  smal l  
Sov ie t  a t t a c k s  o r  a t t a c k s  from o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  and p r o t e c t  m i s s i l e  s i l o s  o r  
c r i t i c a l  m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e y  a r g u e .  These d e f e n s e s  would s t r e n g t h e n  
d e t e r r e n c e  and s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y  ( t h r o u g h  t h r e a t  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n )  by e n s u r i n g  
t h a t  t h e  United 
f o r c e  . 2 3 /  -
Some a rgue  
d e f e n s e s  cannot  
S t a t e s  would r e t a i n  a  s t r o n g  p o s t - a t t a c k  r e t a l i a t o r y  n u c l e a r  
though t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  a r e  i n h e r e n t l y  u n s t a b l e  because  
be made p e r f e c t  end t h a t  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons 
cannot  be  changed.  T h e r e f o r e ,  imper fec t  d e f e n s e s  t h a t  would a l l o w  even a few 
n u c l e a r  weapons t o  p e n e t r a t e  would cause  widespread d e s t r u c t i o n .  T h i s  e n s u r e s  
t h a t  r e l i a n c e  on o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  weapons t o  d e t e r  Sov ie t  a t t a c k  on t h e  United 
S t a t e s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  i n d e f i n i t e l y .  S t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  a l s o  cou ld  be  used t o  
2 2 /  U.S. P r e s i d e n t ,  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e ,  10 p .  -
2 3 /  S l o s s ,  Leon. The Return  o f  S t r a t e g i c  Defense.  S t r a t e g i c  Review, 
v .  1 2 T ~ u m m e r  1984. p .  37-44. 
p r o t e c t  m i s s i l e s  i n  ways t h a t  would prove d e s t a b i l i z i n g ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  v iew.  
Limited d e f e n s e s  cou ld  be  used ,  f o r  example,  t o  defend a g a i n s t  any  s u r v i v i n g  
m i s s i l e s  t h a t  might be launched by a n  opponent a f t e r  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  had a t t a c k e d  
f i r s t .  T h i s  would c r e a t e  s t r o n g  t e m p t a t i o n s  i n  a  c r i s i s  t o  a t t a c k  f i r s t .  - 24/
A l l  a g r e e ,  however, t h a t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r i s k s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  t o  c r i s i s  
s t a b i l i t y  ( t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which d e t e r r e n c e  i s  r e s i s t a n t  t o  f a i l u r e  i n  a  major  
c r i s i s )  a r e  h i g h .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  i t  i s  dec ided  t o  d e p l o y  any l e v e l  o f  s t r a t e g i c  
d e f e n s e s ,  most a g r e e  t h a t  c a r e f u l l y  c r a f t e d  o f f e n s i v e  and d e f e n s i v e  f o r c e  s t r u c -  
t u r e s  coupled wi th  we l l -de f ined  arms 
f u r t h e r  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  g o a l s .  
ARMS CONTROL 
The U.S. d e b a t e  o v e r  arms c o n t r  
c o n t r o l  c o n s t r a i n t s  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
o  nea r -  and long- t  01 and SDI d i v i d e s  i n t  
i s s u e s .  Near-term i s s u e s  f o c u s  on p e r m i s s i b l e  a c t i v i t i e s  and a r e  t i e d  p r i m a r i l y  
t o  t h e  ABM T r e a t y ,  wi th  which t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s a y s  t h e  SDI w i l l  comply. 
The ABM T r e a t y  does  n o t  r e s t r i c t  r e s e a r c h ,  a l t h o u g h  views d i f f e r  on what c o n s t i -  
t u t e s  r e s e a r c h  and whether some planned SDI a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  i n c l u d e d .  The T r e a t y  
does  p r o h i b i t  d e v e l o p i n g ,  t e s t i n g  , o r  d e p l o y i n g  a i r - b a s e d ,  sea-based , space-based , 
and mobi le  land-based ABM sys tems and components;  and i t  l i m i t s  deployment o f  
f i x e d ,  land-based sys tems o r  components. Near-term i s s u e s  c a n  b e  summarized 
a s  f o l l o w s :  
o  The c o n t r o v e r s y  o v e r  c e r t a i n  T r e a t y  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  an ABM "component", " t e s t i n g "  i n  an ABM mode, "dev- 
elopment",  and even " s t r a t e g i c  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  ." A t  i s s u e  i s  
t h e  p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  t e rms  and whether  c e r t a i n  SDI 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  " technology demons t ra t ions ' '  and f u t u r e  
24/ Bundy, McGeorge, George F. Kennan, Rober t  S. McNamara, and Gerard 
C .  s m i t h .  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Choice:  ' S t a r  Wars' o r  Arms C o n t r o l .  F o r e i g n  
A f f a i r s ,  v .  63, Winter 1984/85. p.  264-278. 
t e s t s ,  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  cons ide red  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  by 
t h o s e  who hold  t o  d i f f e r e n t  views o f  t h e s e  t e rms .  
o  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  "new p h y s i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s "  ( e . g . ,  l a s e r s ,  
p a r t i c l e  beams, microwaves) a s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  Agreed Statement D 
o f  t h e  T r e a t y .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  broad view o f  
t h e  T r e a t y  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  which a l lows  deve lop ing  and t e s t i n g  
o f  a l l  sys tems o r  components based on f u t u r e  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  j u s t  land-based sys tems .  O t h e r s ,  who n e g o t i a t e d  t h e  T r e a t y  
( e . g . ,  Ambassador Gerard Smi th ) ,  a rgue  t h a t  such a  v iew i s  wrong 
and t h a t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l ,  r e s t r i c t i v e  v i e w  p r o h i b i t i n g  t e s t i n g  
o f  such technologies--which t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
have been fo l lowing- - i s  c o r r e c t .  2 5 1  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  announced 
i t  would adhere  t o  t h e  restri~tivrinter~retation f o r  now. - 2 6 1  
o  The so -ca l l ed  non-circumvention p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  p r o h i b i t s  
deployment o r  t r a n s f e r  o f  ABM components o r  technology t o  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s .  This  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  p o t e n t i a l  a l l i e d  involvement i n  SDI 
and r e l a t e d  r e s e a r c h ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  development o f  t h e a t e r  
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e s  wi th  t h e  A l l i e s .  
o  The dua l -use  p o t e n t i a l  o f  c e r t a i n  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  These a r e  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  t h a t  have ABM a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  bu t  a r e  employed i n  
sys tems ( e  . g . ,  phased-array r a d a r s ,  advanced a i r  d e f e n s e s ,  
a n t  i - t a c t  i c a l  m i s s i l e s ,  and a n t i - s a t e l l i t e  weapons) o u t s i d e  t h e  
purview o f  t h e  ABM T r e a t y .  
The d e b a t e  a l s o  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  longer-term r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  s t r a t e g i c  de fense  
and arms c o n t r o l .  Some sugges t  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  can l ead  t o  deep  arms 
r e d u c t i o n s  and a  more s t a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  among t h e  n u c l e a r  powers. 
The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t a k e s  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  and o u t l i n e s  a  th ree -phase  t r a n s i -  
t i o n  t o  a  d e f e n s e  dominated s t r a t e g y :  near- term SDI r e s e a r c h ,  l a t e r  r e d u c t i o n s  
o f  o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  and f i n a l l y  deployment o f  e f f e c t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  
t h a t  would r e n d e r  n u c l e a r  weapons "impotent  and o b s o l e t e  . ' I  - 2 7 1  An opposing 
2 5 1  I n t e r v i e w  wi th  Ambassador Gerard C .  Smith.  Meet t h e  P r e s s .  -
Nov. 10,  1985. 
2 6 1  See: S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  George S h u l t z  speech b e f o r e  t h e  North A t l a n t i c  
~ s s e m ~ ~ ,  San F r a n c i s c o ,  C a l i f i o r n i a ,  Oct . 14, 1985. Excerp t s  r e p r i n t e d  i n  New 
York Times, Oct .  15,  1985. p.  A6. 
2 7 1  See U.S. L i b r a r y  o f  Conress .  Congress iona l  Research S e r v i c e .  
The NZ S t r a t e g i c  Concept. Report no. 85-134 F ,  by Robert Jackson ,  Apr. 18,  
1985. 17 p. Also:  N i t z e ,  P a u l ,  On t h e  Road t o  a  More S t a b l e  Peace .  
view i s  t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  and arms c o n t r o l  a r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  b e c a u s e ,  
t h e y  a r g u e ,  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  w i l l  l ead  t o  a n  o f f e n s e - d e f e n s e  arms r a c e  t h a t  
arms c o n t r o l  w i l l  be unab le  t o  c o n t a i n .  281 A t h i r d  v iew a c c e p t s  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  -
p e r f e c t  d e f e n s e s  a r e  no t  l i k e l y ,  l i m i t e d  d e f e n s e s  under c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
can enhance arms c o n t r o l  s t a b i l i t y - - t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which opposing f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e s  
a r e  i n  a  b a l a n c e  t h a t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  impervious  t o  sudden a l t e r a t i o n  from new 
arms deployments o r  weapons t echno logy  innovation--by e n s u r i n g  a  s u r v i v a b l e  
r e t a l i a t o r y  f o r c e .  29/ Those who adopt t h e  f i r s t  two approaches ,  c r i t i c i z e  t h e  -
t h i r d  approach a s  dangerous  i n  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  n u c l e a r  
war because  i t  could  c r e a t e ,  th rough  mixing d e f e n s i v e  and o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  
s t r o n g  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  use  n u c l e a r  weapons f i r s t  i n  a  c r i s i s  o r  r i s k  l o s i n g  them. 
ALLIANCE REACTIONS 
The A l l i e d  response  t o  SDI h a s  evolved o v e r  t ime  from o p p o s i t i o n ,  which was 
i n i t i a l l y  widespread and n o n - s p e c i f i c ,  t o  one o f  g e n e r a l  ambivalence .  On one 
hand,  t h e r e  i s  suppor t  f o r  SDI r e s e a r c h  p r i m a r i l y  because  t h e  S o v i e t s  a r e  conduct-  
ing  a  v i g o r o u s  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  r e s e a r c h  program o f  t h e i r  own. But ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand,  t h e r e  a r e  s e r i o u s  r e s e r v a t i o n s  about  t h e  United S t a t e s  go ing  beyond a  
r e s e a r c h  program. The c h a r a c t e r  o f  a l l i e d  r e s e r v a t i o n s  s tems from t h r e e  main 
s o u r c e s :  t h e  a l l i a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  European s e c u r i t y ,  and U.S.-Soviet r e l a -  
t i o n s .  The A l l i e s  have a l s o  demons t ra ted  concern  o v e r  t h e  f u t u r e  c a p e t  i t  i v e n e s s  
o f  t h e i r  "high-tech" i n d u s t r i e s  and have responded wi th  two i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t h e i r  
28/ Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith ,  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Choice:  ' S t a r  
W a r s ' o r  Arms C o n t r o l ,  p.  264-278. 
29/ Gray,  C o l i n ,  S. D e t e r r e n c e ,  Arms C o n t r o l ,  and t h e  Defense  T r a n s i t i o n .  
0 r b i s T v .  28, Summer 1984. p. 227-240. 
own: EUREKA (European Research Cooperat ion Agency) and E D 1  ( ~ u r o p e a n  Defense 
I n i t i a t i v e ) .  These i s s u e s  a r e  addressed below. 
( 1 )  The o v e r a l l  A l l i a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The A l l i e s  d e s i r e  e q u a l  p a r t n e r -  
s h i p  and e a r l y  c o n s u l t a t i o n  on major  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  A l l i a n c e ,  such 
a s  SDI (which t h e y  d i d  not  g e t ) .  They a r e  a l s o  concerned t h a t  l a c k  o f  mutua l ly -  
agreed upon s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  SDI ( ~ r i m a r i l y  whether o r  how 
Europe would be defended)  p r o v i d e s  t h e  S o v i e t s  wi th  propaganda o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t o  weaken t h e  A l l i a n c e  by e x p l o i t i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  U.S.-European views o v e r  
s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  and arms c o n t r o l .  
( 2 )  European s e c u r i t y .  The Europeans a r e  concerned t h a t  SDI i n  t h e  n e a r  
term w i l l  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  from c o n v e n t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  needs ( i . e ,  m a t e r i e l  t o  
suppor t  a  conven t iona l  war ) .  They a l s o  f e a r  t h a t  SDI r e j e c t s  t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  
d e t e r r e n c e  by t h r e a t  o f  a s s u r e d  r e t a l i a t i o n ,  which forms t h e  b a s i s  of  European 
s e c u r i t y ,  because  Sov ie t  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  e v e n t u a l l y  w i l l  degrade t h e  d e t e r -  
r e n t  r o l e  o f  B r i t i s h  and French n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  and U.S. s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s  
w i l l  decoup le  t h e  United S t a t e s  from European s e c u r i t y .  Should t h i s  o c c u r ,  i t  
i s  argued,  Europe becomes s a f e  f o r  superpower convent i o n a l  war. 
( 3 )  U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s .  Many Europeans f e a r  t h a t  th rough  SDI t h e  
United S t a t e s  s e e k s  s t r a t e g i c  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  over  t h e  S o v i e t s ,  
and t h a t  e x i s t i n g  arms r a c e  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( e . g . ,  t h e  ABM T r e a t y  and SALT agree -  
ments )  w i l l  be  abandoned. Should t h i s  happen,  superpower r e l a t i o n s  would become 
d e s t a b i l i z e d  and Europe would be  caught i n  a  dilemma between t r y i n g  t o  m a i n t a i n  
A l l i a n c e  commitments wi th  t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  s t a b l e  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  Sov ie t  Union. 301 -
301 See U.S. L i b r a r y  o f  Congress.  Congress iona l  Research S e r v i c e .  The 
SDI a z  U.S. A l l i a n c e  S t r a t e g y ,  Report no. 85-48 F,  Paul E .  G a l l i s ,  Mark M. 
Lowenthal ,  and Marcia S. Smith,  Feb. 1, 1985. Washington, 1985. 75 p .  
Even so ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  has  encouraged an a c t i v e  A l l i e d  r o l e  i n  SDI- 
Defense Sec re t a ry  Weinberger s o l i c i t e d  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i t  i n  March 1985 
when he s e n t  a  l e t t e r  of i n v i t a t i o n  t o  U.S. A l l i e s .  The A l l i e d  response  has  
not  been e n t h u s i a s t i c ,  except f o r  some i n  i n d u s t r y ,  who a r e  eager  t o  j o i n  i n  a  
l a r g e  "high-tech" research  program. 
A l l i ed  governments appear reso lved  t h a t  SDI i s  going ahead, and have 
sought t o  preserve  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  and i n d u s t r i a l  p o t e n t i a l  i n  s e v e r a l  
ways. One such way i s  i n  t h e i r  formal response t o  t h e  U.S. i n v i t a t i o n .  
Seve ra l  governments (France,  Canada, Denmark, Nether lands ,  and Norway) have 
s t r o n g l y  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  SDI and re fused  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e ,  but have i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  could do so  on i t s  own. Other governments (Greece 
and A u s t r a l i a )  t h a t  have re fused  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  and a r e  opposed t o  SDI have 
not t aken  a  p o s i t i o n  regard ing  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e r e  a r e  some government-to-government d i s cus s ions  r ega rd ing  i n d u s t r i a l  p a r t i c -  
i p a t i o n  i n  SDI research .  One agreement was r e c e n t l y  s igned  wi th  B r i t a i n ;  
while  t a l k s  with Germany and I t a l y  cont inue .  The Japanese a r e  wi thhold ing  a  
response u n t i l  a  German d e c i s i o n  i s  made and f u r t h e r  t a l k s  a r e  he ld  w i th  
t h e  United S t a t e s .  The major o b s t a c l e s  t o  such agreements revolve  around 
technology t r a n s f e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  r e sea rch  r i g h t s ,  and funding l e v e l s .  
Europe a l s o  has responded t o  t h e  cha l l enges  of  SDI through a  French-led 
proposal  known a s  EUREKA, which i s  t o  s t i m u l a t e  coope ra t i on  i n  "high-tech" 
r e sea rch  f o r  c i v i l i a n  commercial uses .  EUREKA'S purpose i s  t o  h e l p  c l o s e  t h e  
t echno log ica l  gap with t h e  United S t a t e s  and Japan by promoting t h e  compet i t ive-  
ness  of European "high-tech" goods i n  t h e  marketplace,  and by suppor t ing  t h e  
growth of European t echno log ica l  e x p e r t i s e  i n  t h e  f a c e  of  cha l l enges  from SDI 
and o t h e r  U.S. "high-tech" r e sea rch  programs. EUREKA w i l l  emphasize European 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  i n  developing supercomputers,  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and 
robotics, lasers and particle beams, opto-electronics, new materials, and 
high-speed microelectronics. Although EUREKA currently lacks a coordinated 
structure and major funding, several pilot projects have been approved. EUREKA 
is officially endorsed throughout Europe. 
A third major response to SDI is a military program--the European Defense 
Initiative (EDI), Those countries most committed to this idea are France and 
Germany, but Britain and the Netherlands are also involved. EDI's objectives 
are to develop: 1) an integrated theater air-defense system for Europe (with 
U.S. help), including upgraded surface-to-air missiles and advanced anti-missile 
technologies; 2) "smart weapons" and modern real-time information and delivery 
systems for NATO defense; and, 3) a European surveillance satellite. ED1 
appeals to European interests because it leads to a joint defense strategy, 
keeps European aerospace expertise in Europe and under European control, and 
helps keep European industry at a competitive level in the commercial space 
market. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONCERNS 
The SDI program is a broad-based and fundamental research effort involving 
advanced developments in science and technology (S&T). According to the SDIO, 
the program will be conducted "in the open" as much as possible, and Allied par- 
ticipation is actively being sought. The character of the program raises two 
concerns about technology transfer. One is that the program will be a priority 
target of the Soviet Union's effort to acquire Western technology that has poten- 
tial military applications. This will be a problem in both the United States 
and Allied countries. The other is that Allied participation could give their 
industries access to technological breakthroughs which could enable them to com- 
pete with U.S. industry. 
Because o f  t h e  broad-based n a t u r e  o f  t h e  SDI r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t ,  some o f  i t s  r e -  
s u l t s  w i l l  p robab ly  have many p o t e n t i a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  b o t h  m i l i t a r y  ( b e s i d e s  s t r a -  
t e g i c  d e f e n s e )  and c i v i l i a n .  The S o v i e t s  have had f o r  many y e a r s  a  broad s c a l e  
e f f o r t  t o  a c q u i r e  Western t echno logy  which h a s  m i l i t a r y  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  - 31/ The 
most r e c e n t  r e p o r t i n g  from t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  community c a t e g o r i z e s  S o v i e t  r e q u i r e -  
ments t o  be  i n  a r e a s  which a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a  wide v a r i e t y  o f  weapons and space  
sys tems .  32/ Almost a l l  o f  t h e  a r e a s  a r e  under s t u d y  by ,  and a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  -
many a s p e c t s  o f ,  t h e  SDI program. 
The problem of  p o t e n t i a l  Sov ie t  a c c e s s  t o  Western s c i e n t i f i c  and t e c h n i c a l  
advances  h a s  long been r e c o g n i z e d .  The Uni ted  S t a t e s  h a s  a v i g o r o u s  program o f  
e x p o r t  c o n t r o l  law enforcement ,  p u b l i c  and i n d u s t r i a l  awareness ,  and c o o p e r a t i o n  
w i t h  o u r  A l l i e s  t o  stem t h e  l o s s e s .  Concerns o v e r  SDI r e s e a r c h  have been r e -  
f l e c t  ed i n  A l l i e d  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  b u t  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a p p e a r  t o  remain.  
A l l i e d  i n d u s t r y  i s  pushing f o r  maximum a c c e s s  and minimal c o n t r o l s ,  w h i l e  t h e  
United S t a t e s  p r e f e r s  more s t r i n g e n t  s a f e g u a r d s .  The A l l i e s  want t o  be  s u r e  
t h a t  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  maximum advan tage  o f  r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s ,  
wi thou t  b e i n g  encumbered by r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed on work funded by t h e  United 
S t a t e s .  
Concern i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  about A l l i e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  from t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  
o f  economic c o m p e t i t i o n  seems, a t  p r e s e n t ,  l e s s  w e l l  r ecogn ized .  S t a r k l y  p u t ,  
w i l l  t h e  U.S. t axpayer  be fund ing  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s  i n  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  
w i l l  i n  p a r t  enhance f o r e i g n  a b i l i t y  t o  compete w i t h  U.S. i n d u s t r y ?  
The Europeans q u i c k l y  recogn ized  t h e  i n v e r s e  problem; U.S. companies 
r e c e i v i n g  SDI r e s e a r c h  fund ing  could  g a i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o m p e t i t i v e  advan tage  
31/ Sov ie t  A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Western Technology.  Apr. 1982. 15 p.  -
32/ Sov ie t  A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  M i l i t a r i l y  S i g n i f i c a n t  Western Technology: An 
u p d a t Z  Sept  . 1985. 34 p.  
over  t h e i r  f i r m s .  While some w i l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  SDI ,  a group of  18 European 
c o u n t r i e s  h a s  launched a  c o n c u r r e n t  c i v i l i a n  r e s e a r c h  program c a l l e d  EUREKA 
( s e e  above) .  
I n  summary, t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  t h u s  faced wi th  a  d i f f i c u l t  b a l a n c i n g  
a c t  t o  perform. For p o l i t i c a l ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l ,  and t o  a  l e s s e r  
e x t e n t ,  f i n a n c i a l  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  wants t o  conduct t h e  SDI program 
a s  much i n  t h e  open and w i t h  a s  much A l l i e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  p o s s i b l e .  But,  
an open program wi th  f o r e i g n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a i s e s  two technology t r a n s f e r  con- 
c e r n s - - p o t e n t i a l  Sov ie t  a c c e s s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  g a i n  and A l l i e d  a c c e s s  f o r  commer- 
c i a l  g a i n .  These concerns  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  p r e s e n t  demanding c h a l l e n g e s  f o r  
t h e  United S t a t e s  a s  SDI p roceeds .  
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE 
The i s s u e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f  space  o f t e n  g e n e r a t e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  emc- 
t i o n a l  r e a c t i o n .  S ince  t h e  dawn o f  t h e  s p a c e  age ,  many have f e l t  t h a t  space  
should  be  used f o r  p e a c e f u l  purposes  o n l y .  S e v e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e a t i e s ,  t o  
which t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  a  p a r t y ,  f o s t e r  t h i s  g o a l .  For example,  n u c l e a r  wea- 
pons and n u c l e a r  weapons t e s t s  i n  space  a r e  banned,  and freedom o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  upheld .  33/ -
C i v i l i a n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  manned, space  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  w e l l  known. Less 
we l l  known t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  a r e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  space  f o r  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
purposes .  Both t h e  United S t a t e s  and Sov ie t  Union recognized t h e  m i l i t a r y  v a l u e  
o f  s p a c e  e a r l y  on,  and have made use  o f  i t  e x t e n s i v e l y  t o  suppor t  t e r r e s t r i a l  
3 3 1  See: U.S. Congress .  Sena te .  Committee on Commerce, S c i e n c e ,  and 
~ r a n s p r t a t i o n .  Space Law-Selected Basic Documents, Second Ed.,  Committee , 
P r i n t ,  95th Cong., 2d S e s s . ,  Washington, U.S. Govt . P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1878. 600 p. 
m i l i t a r y  and n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  needs .  Both c o u n t r i e s  have m i l i t a r y  communica- 
t i o n s ,  n a v i g a t i o n ,  e a r l y  warning and weather  s a t e l l i t e s .  And b o t h  have  photo- 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  and o t h e r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o l l e c t i o n  s a t e l l i t e s  which a r e  used,  
among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t o  m o n i t o r  arms c o n t r o l  ag reements .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  s o v i e t s  
have t e s t e d  s e v e r a l  m i l i t a r y  s p a c e  sys tems which have no U.S. c o u n t e r p a r t .  
These i n c l u d e  o p e r a t i o n a l  sys tems such a s  a  c o - o r b i t a l  a n t i s a t e l l i t e  (ASAT) 
system and a  r a d a r  ocean r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  s a t e l l i t e  (RORSAT), which h a s  a  n u c l e a r  
power r e a c t o r ;  a  now o b s o l e t e  f r a c t i o n a l  o r b i t a l  bombardment sys tem (FOBS); 
and,  a  space  p l a n e  under development.  34/ -
Thus, s p a c e  i s  a l r e a d y  h e a v i l y  m i l i t a r i z e d .  The more s a l i e n t  i s s u e  wi th  r e -  
ga rd  t o  SDI i s  whether i t  shou ld  be a l lowed t o  become weaponized,  t h a t  i s ,  whe- 
t h e r  weapons should  be  a l lowed t o  be p laced  i n  E a r t h  o r b i t .  (Note  t h a t  t h e  1967 
Outer  Space T r e a t y  bans o n l y  "nuc lea r  weapons o r  any o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  weapons o f  
mass d e s t r u c t i o n "  from space  .) 
Some a r g u e  t h a t  we shou ld  keep space  p r i s t i n e ,  n o t  a l l o w i n g  o u r  t e r r e s t r i a l  
arms r a c e  t o  extend i n t o  space .  I n  t h i s  v iew,  n a t i o n s  must  c o n t i n u e  t o  a d h e r e  
t o  p e a c e f u l  i n t e n t i o n s  f o r  s p a c e .  Most who h o l d  t h i s  v iew f e e l  t h a t  once  even 
a  s i n g l e  weapon i s  a l lowed i n  space ,  n a t i o n s  w i l l  f o r e c l o s e  f o r e v e r  any hope o f  
keep ing  space  weapons-free.  35/ -
S u p p o r t e r s  o f  SDI g e n e r a l l y  s u b s c r i b e  t o  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  s p a c e  i s  m e r e l y  
a n o t h e r  realm f o r  human endeavor .  A s  n a t i o n s  have extended t h e i r  domain t o  
t h e  s e a  and t h e  a i r ,  t h e y  have  developed a  need t o  d e p l o y  weapon s y s t e m s  i n  
34/ For more d e t a i l s  on ASATs, s e e  Congress iona l  Research S e r v i c e ,  Ant i -  
s a t e l x t e  Weapon Systems.  
35/ J u s t i n ,  Joseph E .  Space: A S a n c t u a r y ,  t h e  High Ground, o r  a  M i l i t a r y  
~ h e a t z ?  I n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  Dimensions o f  Space.  Med f o r d ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  
t h e  F l e t c h e r  School of  Law and Diplomacy o f  T u f t s  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1984. p.  102-115. 
t h o s e  rea lms .  By e x t e n s i o n ,  i n  t h e  v iew o f  s u p p o r t e r s ,  i t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  
space  be  used i n  l i k e  f a s h i o n ;  some a v e r  n a t i o n s  would be  f o o l i s h  t o  deny 
themselves  t h e  chance.  361 -
The l a c k  o f  n a t i o n a l  boundar ies  i n  space  h a s  pe rmi t t ed  a  h o s t  o f  p e a c e f u l ,  
c i v i l i a n  space  endeavors  t o  proceed unimpeded. One can make an ana logy  wi th  
A n t a r c t i c a ,  n o t i n g  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreements  have kept i t  weapons-free.  
(Note ,  i t  i s ,  l i k e  space ,  an  i n h o s p i t a b l e  environment . )  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  one 
can a l s o  make an analogy w i t h  t h e  s e a ,  n o t i n g  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l aw and agreed 
p rocedures  a l l o w  many m i l i t a r y  s h i p s  t o  o p e r a t e  i n  a  g e n e r a l l y  p e a c e f u l  manner. 
"Rules o f  t h e  road" f o r  s p a c e ,  some s u g g e s t  shou ld  be  developed a long  s i m i l a r  
l i n e s .  For example, n a t i o n s  cou ld  a g r e e  on a  "keep-out zone" around s a t e l l i t e s .  
Any approach o f  an  o b j e c t  t o  a s a t e l l i t e  which came w i t h i n  t h e  zone would be con- 
s i d e r e d  a  h o s t i l e  a c t .  
A s  t e c h n o l o g i e s  advance,  a s  n a t i o n s  become more adept  a t  s p a c e  o p e r a t i o n s ,  
and a s  o u r  dependence on space  systems grows,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  u t i l i t y  o f  ma in ta in -  
ing  a s s u r e d  a c c e s s  t o  space  w i l l  undoubtedly  i n c r e a s e .  Even wi thou t  SDI, t h e n ,  
i t  w i l l  l i k e l y  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  a t t r a c t i v e  from a  m i l i t a r y  s t a n d p o i n t  f o r  t h e  
United S t a t e s  t o  possess  some t y p e s  o f  weapons t o  a s s u r e  bo th  t h e  launch o f  new 
s a t e l l i t e s  and t h e  d e f e n s e  o f  t h o s e  a l r e a d y  i n  o r b i t .  Some weapons, such a s  
ASATs, cou ld  undoubtedly be  based on E a r t h  ( t h e  S o v i e t s '  ASAT a l r e a d y  i s ) .  But,  
ASATs a l o n e  may no t  meet a l l  o f  t h e s e  p o t e n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  needs .  I f  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  r e f r a i n s  from dep loy ing  weapons i n  s p a c e ,  w i l l  i t  be  f o r e c l o s i n g  an oppor- 
t u n i t y  t o  improve n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  by us ing  space  i n  t h e  long term t o  e l i m i n a t e  
361 I b i d  . , p .  ,104-106. -
n u c l e a r  weapons on E a r t h ?  O r ,  would U.S. long-term n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  
be  b e t t e r  se rved  by c o n t i n u i n g  t o  p r e c l u d e  weapons i n  space?  A key  e lement  i n  t h e  
U.S. d e c i s i o n  whether o r  n o t  t o  d e p l o y  weapons i n  space  i s  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  p l a c e d  
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s '  a b i l i t y  t o  moni to r  t h e  s p a c e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union and o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  ev idence  o f  t h e i r  c l a n d e s t i n e l y  p l a c i n g  weapons i n  
o r b i t ,  o r  deve lop ing  a  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  do s o  q u i c k l y .  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Congress d i r e c t s  t h e  r a t e  and focus  o f  t h e  SDI p r i m a r i l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  
DOD a u t h o r i z a t i o n  and a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  p r o c e s s .  The SDI h a s  enjoyed s u b s t a n t i a l  
fund ing  i n c r e a s e s  i n  FY85 and FY86. N o n e t h e l e s s ,  a p p r o p r i a t e d  amounts have  
f a l l e n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  s h o r t  o f  DOD r e q u e s t s .  I n  FY86, $2 .75  b i l l i o n  was appro- 
p r i a t e d  o u t  o f  a  r e q u e s t e d  $ 3 . 7  b i l l i o n ,  f o l l o w i n g  a  $ 1 . 4  b i l l i o n  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  
t h e  y e a r  b e f o r e .  A l l o c a t i o n  of FY86 money a c r o s s  t h e  r e s e a r c h  programs was 
l e f t  t o  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  SDIO D i r e c t o r .  
Many i s s u e s  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  i n f l u e n c e  SDI p o l i c y .  Assessment o f  t h e s e  
i s s u e s ,  t o g e t h e r  wi th  a  b e t t e r  unders tand ing  o f  S D I  program d e f i n i t i o n  and 
o b j e c t i v e s ,  w i l l  l i k e l y  l e a d  Congress t o  s c r u t i n i z e  SDI program e l e m e n t s  
more c l o s e l y  t h a n  i n  t h e  p a s t .  Fur the rmore ,  f u t u r e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i o n s  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  SDI a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  a f f e c t e d  b y  two a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a r e  
somewhat e x t r a n e o u s  t o  SDI. They a r e :  1) f i s c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by  
e f f o r t s  t o  r educe  t h e  F e d e r a l  budget  d e f i c i t ;  and 2 )  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o r  absence  
of  new arms agreements between t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  S o v i e t  Union. 
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APPENDIX A: COMMISSIONED STUDIES 
Two s t u d i e s  were commissioned by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  make recommendations 
on how t o  proceed fo l lowing  h i s  speech.  They were t h e  Defensive  ~ e c h n o l o g i e s  
Study and t h e  F u t u r e  S e c u r i t y  S t r a t e g y  Study.  The former ,  a l s o  known a s  
t h e  F l e t c h e r  Study (headed b y  former NASA A d m i n i s t r a t o r  James ~ l e t c h e r ) ,  
a s s e s s e d  t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s .  It concluded t h a t :  
( 1 )  t echno logy  does  no t  now e x i s t  t o  p r o v i d e  a  b a s i s  f o r  a  d e c i s i o n  
t o  produce and d e p l o y  a c t u a l  weapon sys tems  t h a t  a r e  c a p a b l e  o f  
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  g o a l s ;  
( 2 )  powerful  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  becoming a v a i l a b l e ,  however,  t h a t  
j u s t i f y  a  major  t echno logy  development e f f o r t  t o  p r o v i d e  f u t u r e  
t e c h n i c a l  o p t i o n s  t o  defend a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s ;  
( 3 )  r e s e a r c h  and t echno logy  development shou ld  be  i n i t i a t e d  o f  a  m u l t i -  
l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  t o  d e s t r o y  incoming b a l l i s t i c  missiles a t  any and a l l  
s t a g e s  o f  t h e i r  t r a j e c t o r y  ( e . g . ,  b o o s t ,  d u r i n g  which t h e  m i s s i l e  i s  
launched and ascends  i n t o  s p a c e ;  p o s t - b o o s t ,  d u r i n g  which up t o  
perhaps  10 i n d e p e n d e n t l y  t a r g e t e d  warheads might  be  r e l e a s e d  
from t h e  m i s s i l e ;  mid-course,  d u r i n g  which t h e  warheads o r  r e - e n t r y  
v e h i c l e s  (RVs) and perhaps  decoys  t r a v e l  on b a l l i s t i c  t r a j e c t o r i e s  
th rough  s p a c e ;  and t e r m i n a l ,  d u r i n g  which t h e  RVs plummet toward 
t h e i r  t a r g e t s  on E a r t h ) ;  
( 4 )  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  d e v e l o p  s e n s o r s  and b a t t l e  management sys tems  
many t imes  more e f f e c t i v e  t h a n  t h o s e  now i n  use  would b e  needed 
f o r  an  e f f e c t i v e  m u l t i - l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e ;  
( 5 )  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  sys tem u l t i m a t e l y  shou ld  have  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  
d e s t r o y  m i s s i l e s  i n  t h e  boos t  phase  b e f o r e  m u l t i p l e  warheads  
a r e  deployed,  n e c e s s i t a t i n g  t h a t  c e r t a i n  sys tem components b e  
based i n  s p a c e ;  and 
( 6 )  an informed d e c i s i o n  on system development cannot  b e  made b e f o r e  t h e  
end o f  t h e  decade ,  b u t  t h e r e  a r e  near- term d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  t h a t  would 
i n d i c a t e  p r o g r e s s  a s  w e l l  a s  U.S. r e s o l v e  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  
a  new b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  (BMD) sys tem.  371 - 
37/ U .  S. Dept . o f  Defense .  The S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e :  Defens ive  
~ e c h n x o ~ i e s  Study.  Apr. 1984. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1984. p.  2 .  
The l a t t e r  s t u d y ,  a l s o  known a s  t h e  Hoffman Study (headed by Fred Hoffman 
o f  Pan H e u r i s t i c s ) ,  addressed  p o l i c y  i s s u e s .  It concluded t h a t :  
( 1 )  p u r s u i t  o f  advanced d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  could  o f f e r  o p t i o n s  t o  
enhance d e t e r r e n c e  and i n c r e a s e  s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y ;  
( 2 )  some u n c e r t a i n t i e s  remain r e g a r d i n g  s t a b i l i t y  and d e t e r r e n c e  t h a t  
w i l l  n o t  b e  r e s o l v e d  f u l l y  u n t i l  more i s  known about t h e  t e c h -  
n i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  d e f e n s i v e  sys tems and how t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
w i l l  respond t o  t h e  U.S. i n i t i a t i v e ;  
( 3 )  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,  o p t i o n s  f o r  deployment o f  advanced 
BMD shou ld  b e  s t u d i e d  f u r t h e r  and a  broad-based r e s e a r c h  and develop- 
ment (R&D) e f f o r t  would p r o v i d e  a  n e c e s s a r y  and v i t a l  hedge a g a i n s t  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  one-sided Sov ie t  deployment;  
( 4 )  d e f e n s i v e  sys tems must a f f o r d  s e c u r i t y  t o  U.S. a l l i e s  and cannot  
r educe  America 's  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  commitments around t h e  world 
s o  t h a t ,  even a s  R&D i s  pursued,  a  s t r o n g  and modern o f f e n s i v e  d e t e r -  
r e n c e  c a p a b i l i t y  w i l l  s t i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d ;  and 
( 5 )  i n i t i a l l y ,  a  broad r e s e a r c h  program on d e f e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  w i l l  
be  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  e x i s t i n g  U.S. arms c o n t r o l  o b l i g a t i o n s .  - 36/ 
38/ U.S. Dept. of  Defense .  Defense Agains t  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e s :  An Assess-  
ment of Techno log ies  and P o l i c y  I m p l i c a t i o n s .  Apr . 1984. Washington,  U .  S .  Govt . 
P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1984. p .  1-7. 
APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
12/19/85 -- FY86 DOD appropriations passed House and Senate as part of 
H.J. Res. 465 and was signed into law (P.L. 99-190). The 
SDI was appropriated $2.75 billion plus $9.222 million for 
SDI Headquarters management. 
11/19/85 -- President Reagan met with Soviet Premier Gorbachev in Geneva. 
11/08/85 -- FY86 DOD authorization bill was signed into law (P.L. 99-145). 
The SDI funding level authorized was $2.75 billion. 
03/12/85 -- New arms control talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. began in 
Geneva. 
01/07/85 -- Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
met in Geneva. They agreed to new arms control talks in the 
strategic, theater, and space arenas. 
05/18/84 -- Representative Fascell released an interim report from the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee calling for a new space arms 
control policy. 
03/27/84 -- Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson was named director of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. 
03/23/83 -- President Reagan made a nationally televised address in 
which he announced the initiation of a comprehensive and 
intensive effort to define an R&D program leading to a 
defensive system to destroy ballistic missiles. 
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